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GRAND JURY SECRECY-TIME FOR
A REEVALUATION*
WILLIAM B. LYTTON**
The federal grand jury is a place and a process of secrecy. This
secrecy protects innocent individuals from disclosure of the fact that
they may be under investigation. It protects witnesses from being
pressured or threatened by potential defendants. It protects the
government's interest in being able to conduct undercover investi-
gations. As the case law has developed, however, secrecy has be-
come an end unto itself, with the result that entirely legitimate
efforts to use or discover matters that have occurred before the
grand jury are blocked, at a great cost to individual litigants and the
government. There needs to be be a reexamination of the rule of
secrecy-its statutory foundation and its decisional development-
in order that the rule does not become an end unto itself, rather
than merely a means to obtain a result.
THE RULE OF SECRECY
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2) states the general
rule of secrecy:
A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a record-
ing device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney
for the government, or any person to whom disclosure [of matters oc-
curring before the grand jury] is made under paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of
this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand
jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules.
The commonly cited reasons for this rule of secrecy were stated
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Proctor & Gamble:
[1] to prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be
contemplated;
[2] to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations,
* Adapted for a manuscript to be published by West Publishing Company.
** Partner of the law firm Kohn, Savett, Marion & Graf, P.C., Philadelphia PA. Asst.
U.S. Attorney, Chicago/Philadelphia, July 1975 - October 1983; J.D., American Univer-
sity Law School; B.A., Georgetown University, 1970.
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and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from im-
portuning the grand jurors;
[3] to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witness
who may testify before the grand jury and later appear at the trial of
those indicted by it;
[4] to encourage free untrammeled disclosure by persons who have
information with respect to the commission of crimes;
[5] to protect the innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure
of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from the expense
of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.'
This formulation of the reasons for secrecy is frequently cited by
lower courts 2 and has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court.3
Thus, the presumption of both statutory and case law, and
based upon "deeply rooted traditions", is that all grand jury pro-
ceedings are secret. No disclosure of grand jury information may be
made unless such disclosure is authorized specifically by one of the
five exceptions specified in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
6(e)(3), and the case law interpreting the rule. In those situations
where a disclosure would be within Rule 6 but at odds with Proctor &
Gamble, some courts have been willing to accept the argument that
the common law rule of secrecy is broader than the statutory rule of
secrecy.
4
The rule of secrecy applies to everyone in the grand jury and all
who have access to grand jury information, except the witness. Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2) provides that, "No obliga-
tion of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance
with this rule." Because the rule of secrecy specifically applies to
everyone else in the grand jury room except the witness, witnesses
are free to say whatever they like about what did or did not occur
before the grand jury.5
1 356 U.S. 677, 681 n.6 (1958) (quoting United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29
(3rd Cir. 1954)).
2 See, e.g., In re Disclosure of Evidence, 650 F.2d 599, 601 (4th Cir. 1981); Securities
& Exchange Commission v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1382 (D.C. Cir.
1980); United States v. Sobotka, 623 F.2d 764, 766 (2d Cir. 1980).
3 Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979); Illinois v.
Abbott & Associates, Inc., 460 U.S. 557, 572-73 (1983) ("But the rule [of secrecy] is so
important, and so deeply rooted in our traditions, that we will not infer that Congress
has exercised such a power [to modify the rule of secrecy] without affirmatively expres-
sing its intent to do so."); United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 425
(1983) ("In the absence of a clear indication in a statute or Rule, we must always be
reluctant to conclude that a breach of this secrecy has been authorized.").
4 See In re Special Grand Jury (Anchorage Alaska), 674 F.2d 778, 781-82 (9th Cir.
1982); In re Search Warrant for Second Floor Bedroom, 489 F.Supp. 207, 211-12 (D.
R.I. 1980).
5 The Advisory Committee on Rules noted that "[tihe rule does not impose any
obligation of secrecy on witnesses.. . . The seal of secrecy on witnesses seems an un-
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The need for secrecy may diminish with the passage of time or
the occurrence of other circumstances. For instance, the witnesses
themselves may act in such a way as to waive whatever interest they
might have had in the continued secrecy of their grand jury testi-
mony. The witnesses who seek to disclose publicly the transcripts of
their own testimony,6 or waive the right to keep their testimony se-
cret,7 may prompt a court to allow disclosure where otherwise it
would not.
8
WHO MAY BE PRESENT IN THE GRAND JURY
The secrecy of the grand jury initially is insured by the limita-
tion on who may be present in the grand jury room. Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 6(d) provides:
Attorneys for the government, the witness under examination, inter-
preters when needed and, for the purpose of taking the evidence, a
stenographer or operator of a recording device may be present while
the grand jury is in session, but no person other than the jurors may
be present while the grand jury is deliberating or voting.
"Attorney for the government" is a term which is specifically de-
fined to include only "the Attorney General, an authorized assistant
of the Attorney General, a United States Attorney, [and] an author-
ized assistant of a United States Attorney." 9 As discussed below,
when used in connection with the grand jury, "attorney for the gov-
ernment" includes only federal prosecutors.
The witness is obviously the person under oath providing testi-
mony to the grand jury room. No one may accompany him as he
testifies. For instance, if a dangerous witness who is in custody is
going to testify before the grand jury, no guards can be present in
the grand jury room to provide security. Instead, the guards would
have to bring the prisoner in while the grand jury was in recess,
shackle, restrain or otherwise immobilize the witness, and then leave
the room during the witness' examination.
The witness' attorney may not be present in the grand jury.10
The attorney, however, can be immediately outside the grand jury
necessary hardship and may lead to injustice if a witness is not permitted to make a
disclosure to counsel or to an associate." FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) advisory committee
note. See also In re Biaggi 478 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1973).
6 In re Biaggi, 478 F.2d at 493.
7 In re Application of Executive Securities Corp., 702 F.2d 406, 409 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 78 (1983).
8 See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 871-72 n.17 (1966).
9 FED. R. CRiM. P. 54(c); 28 U.S.C. § 515(a) (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 543(a) (1976).
10 United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976). For a review of the argu-
ments in favor of excluding a witness' attorney from the grand jury, see Silbert, Defense
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room. The witness may consult with counsel at any time during the
witness' examination before the grand jury. Indeed, a witness may
consult with counsel after each question that is asked and before the
witness offers an answer. When confronted with a prosecutor's
complaint that such frequent consultations are delaying and ob-
structing the grand jury proceeding, judges rarely impose limita-
tions on the frequency or duration of such consultations between
the grand jury witness and the witness' counsel."
Where an interpreter is required, certain procedures must be
followed. The interpreter must be selected from a list of certified
interpreters maintained by the district court clerk.12 The district
court may also specially designate an interpreter to serve before the
grand jury. 13 Once an interpreter has been properly selected, the
interpreter needs to be sworn by the foreperson to translate accu-
rately and to keep the proceedings secret.
The stenographer who transcribes grand jury sessions is usually
under contract with the U.S. Attorney's office. At the beginning of
each session of the grand jury, the stenographer should be sworn by
the foreperson to report the proceedings accurately and to keep the
proceeding secret. The stenographer is responsible for preparing a
complete record of all the proceedings before the grand jury, except
the deliberations of or voting by the grand jury.14 Thus, every word
said while the grand jury is in session, except during deliberations
or voting, must be recorded. This includes the testimony of the wit-
nesses, the questions asked of the witnesses by either the prosecu-
tors or grand jurors, any statements by the prosecutor to the grand
jury when no witness is present, and any colloquy among the grand
jurors and the prosecutor. No transcript may be prepared from
Counsel in the Grand Jury - the Answer to the White Collar Criminal's Prayers, 15 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 293 (1978).
For a review of the arguments in favor of permitting the witness' attorney to be
present in the grand jury with the witness, see Hixson, Bringing Down the Curtain on the
Absurd Drama of Entrances and Exits - Witness Representation in the Grand Jury Room, 15 AM.
CRiM. L. REv. 307 (1978).
The American Bar Association has taken the position that a witness' counsel should
be allowed to be present in the grand jury room during the questioning of his own
client. American Bar Association, Report to the House of Delegates Section of Criminal Justice:
Hearings on H.R. 94 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of
the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) at 160-62 (policy on grand
jury reform of the ABA Section of Criminal Justice).
I But see United States v. Soto, 574 F.Supp. 986 (D. Conn. 1983).
12 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (1976). See United States Attorney's Manual ["USAM"] § 9-
11.355 (1984).
13 FED. R. CRIM. P. 28.
14 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(1).
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these recordings, except as otherwise required by statute1 5 or court
order. 16 The testimony of witnesses is routinely transcribed.
The record prepared by the stenographer, including any tran-
scripts, must remain in the custody of the attorney for the govern-
ment unless otherwise ordered by the court in a particular case. 17
The U.S. Attorney's office normally designates the stenographer to
be the agent of the government for purposes of maintaining custody
of the original stenographer's record. The prosecutor will usually
keep custody of all transcripts. If all or part of the proceedings
before a grand jury is not recorded as a result of an unintentional
failure of a recording device, the validity of the indictment is not
affected. 18 Finally, while the grand jury is deliberating or voting on
a proposed indictment, no one other than the grand jurors may be
present.
"MATTERS OCCURRING BEFORE THE GRAND JURY"
The rule of secrecy applies only to "matters occurring before
the grand jury."'19 Therefore, any disclosure of information that is
not a matter occurring before the grand jury does not involve Rule
6, the rule of secrecy or any of the five exceptions to the rule of
secrecy. Unfortunately, what is and what is not a matter occurring
before the grand jury is murky at best.
The purpose of the Rule 6(e) is to prevent disclosure of the
essence of what takes place in the grand jury room, what the grand
jury is doing, who it is questioning, what questions it is asking, what
evidence it is receiving, what targets are being investigated, and
what crimes might be charged. 20 The disclosure of such informa-
tion would jeopardize those interests that the rule of secrecy is
designed to protect. 21
15 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976).
16 The court may order that a transcript be prepared in connection with a defend-
ant's request upon a showing that grounds may exist to dismiss the indictment because
of matters occurring before the grand jury, pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (3) (C) (ii).
17 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(1).
18 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(1). However, it might affect the ability of a witness whose
grand jury testimony was not recorded to testify at trial if a court should find a violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 3500 and FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2.
19 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
20 See Fund for Constitutional Government v. National Archives and Records Service,
656 F.2d 856, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1981); In re Grand Jury Investigation (New Jersey State
Commission of Investigation), 630 F.2d 996, 1000 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1081 (1981); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Lance), 610 F.2d 202, 216-17 (5th Cir.
1980); In re GrandJury Investigation of Ven-Fuel, 441 F.Supp. 1299, 1302-03 (M.D. Fla.
1977).
21 United States v. Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 681 n.6 (1958).
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With this in mind, it is obvious that what is protected goes be-
yond the mere words said in the grand jury to include anything that
would tend to disclose what it is that the grand jury is doing.
22
Where grand jury information is disclosed in general terms, how-
ever, without the information being identified as having come from
the grand jury, such disclosure may be sufficiently insulated from
the grand jury so as not to be regarded as the disclosure of "matters
occurring before the grand jury."
23
The transcripts of a witness' testimony before the grand jury,
the transcripts of statements by a prosecutor, or the prosecutor's
colloquies with the grand jury outside the presence of any witness,
are most dearly "matters occurring before the grand jury," and are
thus subject to the rule of secrecy.
A statement to a law enforcement agent or prosecutor by a per-
son subpoenaed by the grand jury, however, presents a separate
problem. In In re the Special February 1975 Grand Jury (Baggot),24 Bag-
got was subpoenaed by the grand jury investigating fraud involving
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). He con-
tacted the prosecutor and met with the prosecutor in the offices of
the U.S. Attorney. Thereafter, the prosecutor prepared a memoran-
dum of his discussion with Baggot. Later, Baggot testified before
the grand jury, was indicted for fraud and pled guilty. The govern-
ment thereafter sought to disclose to the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) some of the physical evidence gathered during the investiga-
tion, along with the memorandum by the prosecutor of his office
interview with Baggot, so that the IRS could proceed in a civil con-
text to assess and collect the additional tax owed by Baggot as a
result of the fraud. The Seventh Circuit held that the prosecutor's
memorandum of his interview in his office with Baggot was a "mat-
ter occurring before the grand jury" and subject to the rule of se-
crecy.25 Thus, evidence clearly relevant to the IRS' tax collection
function, gathered in an investigation in which the taxpayer pled
guilty to fraud, was denied to the IRS.
The Third Circuit has recognized that a federal police investi-
gation usually precedes or compliments a grand jury investigation.
In such a police investigation, witnesses are routinely interviewed by
22 United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285, 291 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
983 (1979).
23 United States v. Bazzano, 570 F.2d 1120, 1125 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 917
(1977).
24 662 F.2d 1232 (7th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as In re Baggot]. This case was
decided by the Supreme Court on issues other than the proper definition of "matters
occurring before the grand jury." United States v. Baggot, 450 U.S. 817 (1983).
25 In re Baggot, 662 F.2d at 1238.
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federal agents who make written summaries of the interviews. 26
The summary of an interview by a federal agent with a person who
also testifies before the grand jury is not thereby automatically and
necessarily transformed into a matter occurring before the grand
jury.27 If the summary of the interview is itself read at a later time to
the grand jury, however, the Third Circuit has suggested that the
summary itself, as well as the transcript of the reading of the sum-
mary are matters occurring before the grand jury.28
Thus, the statement of a grand jury witness, taken outside of
the grand jury, is potentially an item covered by the rule of secrecy.
Its disclosure without court approval, given the current consensus
by the courts, is done at the prosecutor's peril. In addition, docu-
ments created for the use of the grand jury that summarize testi-
mony or other evidence before the grand jury reveal what occurs
before the grand jury, and are thus covered by the rule of secrecy.
The more difficult problem is presented by the proposed dis-
closure of documents subpoenaed by the grand jury. A request for
the disclosure of all documents subpoenaed by the grand jury
presents the risk that such disclosure would reveal what the grand
jury was doing. Thus, it would be allowable only pursuant to one of
the five specified exceptions. But, where a request is made for the
disclosure of discrete documents that have been subpoenaed by the
grand jury, the issue once again becomes rather complex.
The prevailing view among the courts has been that when docu-
ments are sought to be disclosed for their own sake or their own
intrinsic value, rather than to learn what occurred before the grand
jury, the rule of secrecy is not implicated. 29 But in the In re Baggot
case before the Seventh Circuit,30 the court ruled without comment
that third-party business records subpoenaed by the grand jury,
26 Such summaries prepared by agents of the FBI are commonly referred to as
"302s" because they are typed on federal form "FD302."
27 In re Grand Jury Matter (Catania), 682 F.2d 61 (3rd Cir. 1982).
28 In re Grand Jury Matter (Garden Court Nursing Home, Inc.), 697 F.2d 511 (3rd
Cir. 1982).
29 In re Grand Jury Investigation (New Jersey State Commission of Investigation),
630 F.2d 996, 1000 (3rd Cir. 1980); SEC v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 628 F.2d 1368,
1382-83 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993 (1980); Stanford, 589 F.2d at 291; United
States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc., 280 F.2d 52, 54 (2d Cir. 1960); In re Search
Warrant for Second Floor Bedroom, 489 F. Supp. 207, 209-10 (D. R.I. 1980); In re
GrandJury Investigation of Ven-Fuel, 441 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 1977); Capital
Indemnity Corp. v. First Minnesota Construction Co., 405 F.Supp. 929, 931 (D. Mass.
1975); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 211 F. Supp. 729, 734
(N.D. Ill. 1962); Davis v. Romney, 55 F.R.D. 337, 341 (E.D. Pa. 1972); In re Hearings
Before the Committee on Banking and Currency, 19 F.R.D. 410, 412 (N.D. Ill. 1956).
30 662 F.2d 1232 (7th Cir. 1981).
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even though sought for their intrinsic value, were subject to grand
jury secrecy.
3'
The conflicting theories of how to deal with the issue of
whether such documents are subject to the rule of secrecy were
summarized in In reJohn Doe Grand Jury Proceedings.32 The court con-
cluded that there were four approaches. First, subpoenaed docu-
ments are never subject to Rule 6(e)'s limitations.33 Second, the
disclosure of documents subpoenaed by a grand jury is always sub-
ject to the restrictions of Rule 6(e).34 Third, documents that are
sought for their own "intrinsic value in the furtherance of a lawful
investigation" are not subject to the secrecy provisions of Rule 6(e),
the so-called "purpose test."35 Fourth, a court must determine on
an individual case basis whether the "release of the documents will
disclose some secret aspect of matters occurring before the grand
jury. If such disclosure will occur, the court must then determine if
one of the exceptions to the general rule of grand jury secrecy em-
bodied in Rule 6(e) is applicable. If such disclosure will not occur,
then the documents may be released to any party having a legal
right to their production. 36 This discussion neatly highlights the
lack of uniformity on the part of courts in dealing with requests for
disclosure of documents subpoenaed by the grand jury.
Presently pending before Congress is an amendment to Rule
6(e) that would make anything subpoenaed by a grand jury subject
to grand jury secrecy.37 Although this proposed amendment may be
the cleanest and easiest resolution of the problem, it lacks the com-
mon sense approach that the district court in Rhode Island identi-
fied as the fourth approach.
FIRST EXCEPTION: DISCLOSURE TO A FEDERAL PROSECUTOR
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(A)(i) permits dis-
closure to "an attorney for the government for use in the perform-
ance of such attorney's duty."
Normally, an Assistant United States Attorney will be the per-
son who, is most familiar with what the grand jury is doing. There
31 This was a 2-1 decision with a vigorous dissent that claimed that the majority opin-
ion ignored and contradicted the prevailing rule. Id. at 1245. One member of the ma-
jority in that case was the ChiefJudge of the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
sitting by designation. Id. at 1233.
32 537 F. Supp. 1038 (D. R.I. 1982).
33 Id. at 1043.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 1044.
36 Id. The court adopted the fourth approach.
37 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(c)(iv).
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are also many situations in which lawyers from the Criminal Division
of the U.S. Department of Justice will participate in federal grand
jury investigations. Typically, these attorneys will be members of a
"Strike Force."'3 8 Such an attorney must be specifically authorized
by the Attorney General, or his designee, to conduct grand jury pro-
ceedings before the attorney can be considered an "authorized assis-
tant of the Attorney General."'3 9 This is accomplished by an
appointment letter from the Attorney General, or his designee, to
the attorney. Likewise, attorneys from the Department of Justice's
Antitrust Division are assigned to regional offices where they con-
duct criminal investigations using the federal grand jury in the par-
ticular federal district.
An Assistant U.S. Attorney is appointed by the Attorney Gen-
eral to serve in a specific federal district. Similarly, a Criminal Divi-
sion or Antitrust Division attorney is authorized to assist the
Attorney General in one or more specified federal districts.40 If an
Assistant United States Attorney, an Antitrust Division attorney or
Criminal Division attorney wants to conduct a grand jury investiga-
tion in a federal district other than those in which he has been spe-
cifically authorized to act, the attorney must then receive a new and
specific authorization to appear before the grand jury in such other
federal district.
4 '
The Department of Justice and the offices of the United States
Attorneys have many attorneys whose duties do not relate to the
enforcement of the federal criminal statutes. These attorneys, with
duties that relate exclusively to the civil law as opposed to criminal
law, are not included within this first exception. 42 In deciding this
issue, the Supreme Court in United States v. Sells Engineering, cited
three problems that would arise from a contrary holding. First, dis-
closure to other than federal prosecutors increases the number of
people with access to grand jury information.43 As a result, not only
is the possibility of a "leak" increased, but witnesses may be more
reluctant to testify fully and candidly if they know their testimony
38 See United States v. Zuber, 528 F.2d 981, 982 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Santiago, 528 F.2d 1130, 1135 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 972 (1976); In re Persico,
522 F.2d 41, 60 (2d Cir. 1975).
39 United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 431 n.12 (1983).
40 Strike Force attorneys are usually assigned to cover a geographic area that in-
cludes more than one federal district.
41 See United States v. Prueitt, 540 F.2d 995, 999-1003 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1063 (1976); In re Persico, 522 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Wrigley, 520
F.2d 362, 367 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975).
42 Sells Engineering, 463 U.S. at 427.
43 Id. at 432.
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will be routinely available for use in governmental civil litigation or
administrative action. Second, a contrary holding would pose a po-
tential for misuse because prosecutors might be tempted to use the
power of the grand jury to obtain evidence useful in a civil lawsuit.
44
Such an abuse would be very difficult to detect and prove. Third, it
would be unfair for government attorneys in civil litigation to have
the advantage of using the grand jury as an ex parte form of civil
discovery unavailable to other litigants.
45
An unresolved issue is whether an attorney for the Department
of Justice who has properly received grand jury information in his
role as a prosecutor can then use that information in the civil phase
of the case.46 The same concerns that prompted the decision in the
Sells Engineering case, however, would suggest that such a situation,
at the very least, is one that involves a serious risk for the govern-
ment. The problem is a practical one because in many United States
Attorney's offices, attorneys have both criminal law and civil law
responsibilities.
Attorneys employed by the federal government in departments
or agencies other than the Department ofJustice are not included in
the first exception unless and until they have been designated and
sworn in as Special Assistants to the United States Attorney, or are
otherwise made authorized assistants of the Attorney General.
47
Once so designated, these federal attorneys can participate fully in a
grand jury investigation as an "attorney for the government," as de-
fined in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c).
48
Where a federal grand jury investigation involves, for example,
false statements to a federal agency, and the expertise of that
agency's attorney is necessary to aid the investigation, agency attor-
neys are often made Special Assistants to the United States Attor-
ney. Such specially designated agency attorneys, however, may not
thereafter disclose grand jury information within their own agency
unless such disclosure is specifically authorized under the rule.
Where an agency issues regulations or initiates civil or administra-
tive proceedings, and an agency attorney who had access to relevant
grand jury information participates in that process, there is a risk
that such participation violates the rule of secrecy.
49
44 Id.
45 Id. at 433.
46 This issue was specifically not addressed in Sells Engineering, 463 U.S. 431 at n.15.
47 Id. at 429 n.12.
48 See In re Perlin, 589 F.2d 260, 267 (7th Cir. 1978).
49 See United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336, 1350-51 (N.D. 111. 1979). Moreover,
a federal lawyer must not act as both a witness and an attorney in the grand jury pro-
ceeding. Id. at 1351. See also United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 562 (3rd Cir.
11091984]
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There are frequent occasions when federal and state prosecu-
tors are working together on a criminal investigation. The mere fact
that they are working together does not bring the local prosecutor
within any exception to the rule of secrecy.
Nonfederal attorneys, even if they work for state or municipal
prosecutors, are not "attorneys for the government" and thus are
not included in the first exception. 50 Any attorney admitted to the
bar of a state, however, may be appointed by the Attorney General
of the United States to conduct grand jury investigations. 5'
Disclosure pursuant to the first exception is automatic in the
sense that the court does not have to be notified of or give its ap-
proval to the disclosure.52 Thus, except for whatever internal
records a prosecutor may maintain, there is no official record of
what grand jury material was disclosed to which federal prosecutors.
Most disclosures of grand jury information occur pursuant to
this exception. A prosecutor shares the information with other
prosecutors in the office, superiors in the United States Attorney's
office or in the Department of Justice, and prosecutors from other
offices in other districts. As long as such a disclosure is made for
use by the attorney to whom the disclosure is made in the perform-
ance of that attorney's duty to enforce the federal criminal law, then
the disclosure is proper.53
SECOND EXCEPTION: DISCLOSURE TO FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) (3) (A) (ii) permits dis-
closure to "such government personnel as are deemed necessary by
an attorney for the government to assist an attorney for the govern-
ment in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce federal
criminal law."
This language was added to Rule 6 in 1977 and recognizes the
fact that in many cases, a prosecutor and a grand jury rely on a fed-
eral law enforcement agent to actually conduct the investigation. 54
The Advisory Committe notes on this section fully amplify this
central fact of federal prosecution:
1979) (no inherent conflict of interest in appointing agency attorney to conduct criminal
proceedings before grand jury), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 906 (1980); MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 5-102 (1982).
50 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 309 F.2d 440, 443 (3rd Cir. 1962).
51 28 U.S.C.A. § 515 (West 1968).
52 FED. R. CIUM. PROC. 6(e)(3)(A)(i).
53 Id.
54 Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue Service, 406 F. Supp.
1098 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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Attorneys for the Government in the performance of their duties with
a grand jury must possess the authority to utilize the services of other
government employees. Federal crimes are "investigated" by the FBI,
the IRS, or by Treasury agents and not by government prosecutors or
the citizens who sit on grandjuries. Federal agents gather and present
information relating to criminal behavior to prosecutors who analyze
and evaluate it and present it to grand juries. Often the prosecutors
need the assistance of the agents in evaluating evidence. Also, if fur-
ther investigation is required during or after grand jury proceedings,
or even during the course of criminal trials, the federal agents must do
it. There is no reason for a barrier of secrecy to exist between the
facets of the criminal justice system upon which we all depend to en-
force the criminal laws. 55
This exception applies not only to federal agents, but also to
any other federal employee who can assist the prosecutor. Lawyers
for federal agencies who have particular expertise and have not
been designated an "attorney for the government" can be provided
grand jury information under this second exception. Once they
have received grand jury information, however, they can disclose it
to other people, including their immediate agency supervisor, only
if those other people qualify for disclosure under one of the six spe-
cific exceptions to the rule of secrecy. 56 The rule specifically pro-
vides that a person to whom disclosure is made pursuant to this
exception "shall not utilize that grand jury material for any purpose
other than assisting the attorney for the government in the perform-
ance of such attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law." 57 It is
generally accepted that local law enforcement personnel are not in-
cluded within the definition of "government personnel,"58 as used
in Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii).
Once disclosure under this exception is either contemplated or
accomplished, the prosecutor "shall promptly provide the district
court, before which was impanelled the grand jury whose material
has been so disclosed, with the names of the persons to whom such
disclosure has been made." 59 This requirement of notice to the
court, however, does not entitle a witness responding to a subpoena
duces tecum to disclosure of such a notice as a precondition to com-
plying with the subpoena. 60
55 FED. R. GRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(a)(ii) advisory committee note.
56 See supra notes - and accompanying text.
57 FED. R. GRiM. P. 6(e)(3)(B).
58 In re Miami Federal Grand Jury No. 79-9, 478 F. Supp. 490, 492 (S.D. Fla. 1979);
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 445 F. Supp. 349, 350 (D. R.I. 1978). But see In re 1979
GrandJury Proceedings, 479 F. Supp. 93, 96 (E.D. N.Y. 1979) ("government personel"
not limited to federal employees).
59 FED. R. GRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(B).
60 In re GrandJury Proceedings, 579 F.2d 836, 839-40 (3rd Cir. 1978).
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Disclosure under this second exception does not require the
prior approval of the court; all that is required is that the court be
notified. Thus, prosecutors routinely file with the district court
"Disclosure Notices" that identify those federal personnel to whom
disclosure has been or will be made in a particular grand jury inves-
tigation. Because such disclosure notices require no action by a
judge, it is questionable how much judicial attention they receive.
The notices may become important, however, where a leak of grand
jury information occurs. In such a case, the disclosure notice serves
as part of a "paper trail" that identifies those who had access to the
material, and thereby helps a court track down the source of the
leak.
The Advisory Committee contemplated that the names of the
federal personnel to whom disclosure is made will generally be fur-
nished to the court before the disclosure occurs. 61 The rule, how-
ever, is drafted in a manner that will not inhibit the ability of federal
prosecutors to share grand jury information with federal personnel
with whom they are working. In addition, the rule does not specify
to what lengths a prosecutor should go to identify those federal per-
sonnel who have access to the grand jury information. A strict read-
ing of the rule suggests that the prosecutor's secretary, the operator
of the duplicating equipment, and FBI clerks all should be listed on
a disclosure notice. In practice, however, different districts have dif-
ferent procedures. In some districts, the prosecutor will list only the
case agent to whom disclosure is made. Any disclosure by the case
agent to other federal agents may not be disclosed to the court,
although the case agent should keep his own records. Such short-
cut procedures are ripe for attack as violating the rule of secrecy.
THIRD EXCEPTION: DISCLOSURE PRELIMINARY TO OR IN CONNECTION
WITH A JUDICIAL PROCEEDING
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(C)(i) permits dis-
closure of matters occurring before the grand jury "when so di-
rected by a court preliminary to or in connection with a judicial
proceeding." This exception is the most difficult to apply and the
one most litigated. It applies to the disclosure of grand jury matters
to anyone who is not either a federal prosecutor or assisting a fed-
eral prosecutor. Before a disclosure can be made pursuant to this
exception, the party seeking the disclosure must make a motion in
the district court. Any hearing on such a motion is usually ex parte.
61 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(a)(ii) advisory committee note.
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No disclosure can be made until the court has granted the motion
and issued an appropriate order.
Typically, the government will seek a disclosure order under
this exception so that the grand jury material in question may be
shared with some other tribunal.62 In addition, after a criminal
prosecution with financial implications has been concluded, the
government often seeks to disclose information acquired during the
grand jury investigation to the Internal Revenue Service for any ap-
propriate administrative or civil action. 63 Other parties, however,
may also seek disclosure. Such disclosure motions have been made,
and denied, on many bases, including the Freedom of Information
Act 64 and the Clayton Act.65
In order for this exemption to apply, there must first be a "judi-
cial proceeding." 66 Most courts have accepted Judge Learned
Hand's definition of judicial proceeding:
The term "judicial proceeding" includes any proceeding determinable
by a court, having for its object the compliance of any person, subject
to judicial control with standards imposed upon his conduct in the
public interest, even though such compliance is enforced without the
procedure applicable to the punishment of crime. An interpretation
that should not go at least so far, would not only be in the teeth of the
language employed, but would defeat any rational purpose that can be
imputed to the rule.
67
62 See, e.g., In re GrandJury Matter (Catania), 682 F.2d 61, 65-66 (3rd Cir. 1982).
63 E.g., Baggot, 459 U.S. at 817. See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
64 Piccolo v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 90 F.R.D. 287 (D. D.C. 1981). The Free-
dom of Infomation Act [FOIA] contains certain exemptions, including exemption 3, 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(c)(3) (1976), which allows the government to withhold from disclosure
information "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute." While the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are issued by the Supreme Court under rulemaking powers
delegated by Congress, and thus are not "statutes", Founding Church of Scientology v.
Bell, 603 F.2d 945, 951-952 (D.C. Cir. 1979), FED. R. CIuM. P. 6(e), at least, was affirma-
tively adopted by both houses of Congress, P.L. 95-78, and thus is a "statute" within the
meaning of Exemption 3 of FOIA. Consequently, grand jury matters covered by FED. R.
CRIM. P. 6(e) are not discoverable pursuant to FOIA.
65 In Illinois v. Abbott & Associates, Inc., 460 U.S. 557 (1983), the Attorney General
of Illinois asserted a statutory right to grand jury materials pursuant to § 4F(b) of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15f(b) (1976). That section authorizes the Attorney General of
the United States to make available federal investigative files and materials to a state
attorney general when the U.S. Attorney General has reason to believe that a State attor-
ney general would be entitled to bring a federal civil antitrust action against a defendant
being sued by the United States under the antitrust laws. The Supreme Court held that
this statute did not give a state attorney general any special right to grand jury material.
To prevail, a state attorney general has to meet the requirements of the third exemption
just as any private litigant must. The district court, however, can always consider and
weigh the public interest when ruling on a disclosure request based on this third exemp-
tion. Abbott &Associates, 460 U.S. at 467 n.15.
66 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(c)(i).
67 Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 1958).
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Various types of proceedings have been found to be "judicial
proceedings" pursuant to this exception. These include a bar com-
mittee in charge of disciplining attorneys,68 a police board of in-
quiry,69 a grievance committee of the New York City Bar
Association, 70 and a state grand jury.71
In United States v. Baggot,72 the government sought the disclo-
sure of grand jury information to the Internal Revenue Service in an
audit of Baggot's tax liability; Baggot had pled guilty to engaging in
sham commodities transactions to create paper losses, which he de-
ducted on his tax returns.
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether an IRS inves-
tigation to determine a taxpayer's civil liability was "preliminary to
or in connection with a judicial proceeding" within the meaning of
this third exception. The Court ruled it was not.
73
In reaching its decision, the Court first determined whether the
IRS audit was a "judicial proceeding." The government conceded it
was not. Baggot, however, conceded that a tax petition for redeter-
mination or a suit for refund would be a judicial proceeding. The
Court accepted both of these concessions and noted that the "judi-
cial proceedings" language of this exception
imposes an additional criterion governing the kind of need that must
be shown. It reflects a judgment that not every beneficial purpose, or
even every valid governmental purpose, is an appropriate reason for
breaching grand jury secrecy. Rather, the Rule contemplates only uses
related fairly to some identifiable litigation, pending or anticipated.
Thus it is not enough to show that some litigation may emerge from
the matter in which the material is to be used, or even that litigation is
factually likely to emerge. The focus is on the actual use to be made of
the material. If the primary purpose of disclosure is not to assist in
preparation or conduct of a judicial proceeding, disclosure under
(C)(i) is not permitted.
74
The second issue the Court faced in Baggot was whether the IRS
audit, admittedly not a "judicial proceeding," was nonetheless "pre-
68 In re Disclosure of Testimony Before the GrandJury, 580 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1981).
69 In re Special February 1971 Grand Jury v. Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1973).
70 Rosenbery, 255 F.2d 118.
71 In re GrandJury Matter, 682 F.2d 61 (3rd Cir. 1982); In re Disclosure of Evidence,
650 F.2d 599, modified, 662 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1981); Stanford, 589 F.2d 285 (7th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 983 (1979); Matter of Disclosure of Testimony, 580 F.2d 281
(8th Cir. 1978); In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 390 F.Supp. 344, 346 (W.D. Tex. 1975); In re
Grand Jury Witness Subpoenas, 370 F.Supp. 1282 (S.D. Fla. 1974); In re Grand Jury
Disclosure, 550 F. Supp. 1171 (E.D. Va. 1982). But see United States v. Tager, 638 F.2d
167 (10th Cir. 1980).
72 463 U.S. 476 (1983).
73 Id. at 477.
74 Id. at 480.
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liminar[y] to or in connection with" ajudicial proceeding that would
result from such an audit.7 5 Because it was possible that the audit
would not result in litigation, the Court concluded that the audit was
not preliminary to or in connection with litigation. The application
for disclosure was premature and the possibility of litigation was too
speculative:
Where an agency's action does not require resort to litigation to ac-
complish the agency's present goal, the action is not preliminary to a
judicial proceeding for purposes of (C)(i). . . In this case, however,
it is clear that the IRS' proposed use of the [grand jury] materials is to
perform the non-litigative function of assessing taxes rather than to
prepare for or conduct litigation.
7 6
The term "in connection with" in the third exception is easier
to define. It comes into play when litigation is already commenced.
The term "preliminar[y] to" is more inclusive, but, based on Baggot,
it seems to apply only to situations where litigation is actually being
prepared.
Having decided that a judicial proceeding exists, or will shortly,
and thus that the grand jury material that is sought is "preliminar[y]
to or in connection with ajudicial proceeding," a court must go fur-
ther before deciding whether to grant a request for disclosure under
this exception. The question is what standard should courts use in
deciding whether to grant the disclosure that is "preliminar[y] to or
in connection with a judicial proceeding."
In the absence of any language in the Rule itself or any descrip-
tion by the Advisory Committee of what substantive standard courts
should use, courts have created the standard of "particularized
need."' 77 On the theory that there should be some good reason to
breach grand jury secrecy, proponents of disclosure under this ex-
ception must show a particularized need for the grand jury informa-
tion. The standard was described in detail in Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol
Stops Northwest:7
8
Parties seeking grand jury transcripts under Rule 6(e) must show
[1] that the material they seek is needed to avoid a possible injustice in
another judicial proceeding,
[2] that the need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued
secrecy, and
[3] that this request is structured to cover only material so needed.79
75 Id. at 482.
76 Id. at 482-83.
77 Abbott &Associates, 460 U.S. 557; Dennis, 384 U.S. at 869-70; Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 398-401, reh'g denied, 361 U.S. 855 (1959); Proctor &
Gamble, 356 U.S. at 681-83.
78 441 U.S. 211 (1979).
79 441 U.S. at 222, quoted in Sells Engineering, 463 U.S. at 443.
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This particularized need test has been described by the
Supreme Court as "a criterion of need."80 It is a narrow avenue for
disclosure that "was not designed as an authorization for pre-trial
discovery. Its purpose, on the contrary, is to protect the secrecy of
the grand jury proceedings by restricting disclosure to the excep-
tional case where a particularized need is shown."81 This criterion
of need also was discussed in Douglas Oil:
It is clear from Proctor & Gamble and Dennis that disclosure is appropri-
ate only in those cases where the need for it outweighs the public in-
terest in secrecy, and that the burden of demonstrating this balance
rests upon the private party seeking disclosure. It is equally clear that
as the considerations justifying secrecy become less relevant, a party
asserting a need for grand jury transcripts will have a lesser burden in
showing justification. In sum, . . . the court's duty in a case of this
kind is to weigh carefully the competing interests in light of the rele-
vant circumstances and the standards announced by this Court. And if
disclosure is ordered, the court may include protective limitations on
the use of the disclosed material. 82
As a practical matter, the Douglas Oil test is a very difficult stan-
dard to meet for someone seeking disclosure under this exception.
The second and third prongs of the Douglas Oil test rarely pose a
problem. It usually is not difficult to show that the need for disclo-
sure is greater than the need for continued secrecy. This showing
can be bolstered by carefully structuring the request to limit what is
sought and by recommending to the court appropriate protective
limitations.
The problem is the first step presented by the Douglas Oil case.
It is rare for a party to be able to show that the disclosure is neces-
sary in order to avoid a possible injustice in another proceeding.
Convenience or cost savings alone are not enough. If the informa-
tion sought is available from sources other than the grand jury ma-
terial, then the party requesting disclosure must seek it from those
other sources.83 In Baggot, for example, if the proceedings had ad-
vanced to such a point that they were preliminary to a judicial pro-
ceeding, a court would have been justified in telling the IRS to
conduct its own administrative or civil investigation, even if it meant
80 Baggot, 463 U.S. at 480.
81 United States v. Weinstein, 511 F.2d 622, 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042
(1975).
82 441 U.S. at 223, quoted in Sells Engineering, 463 U.S. at 443.
83 "[I]n weighing the need for disclosure, the court could take into account any alter-
native discovery tools available by statute or regulation to the agency seeking disclo-
sure." 463 U.S. at 445. The Ninth Circuit has applied the Sells Engineering opinion




issuing summons for documents already subpoenaed by the grand
jury and interviewing witnesses who had already testified before the
grand jury. The Supreme Court has "consistently rejected the argu-
ment that such savings [of time and expense] can justify a breach of
grand jury secrecy."' 84 Where the material sought is unavailable
from another source, however, and that material is key to avoiding
an "injustice" in another proceeding, then disclosure would be ap-
propriate. The witness who has died, the document that has disap-
peared, or other similarly compelling reasons should be enough to
meet the particularized need test.
8 5
It makes no difference if the party seeking disclosure under this
exception is the government or a private party. The Douglas Oil test
"governs disclosure to public parties as well as private ones."8 6 Yet,
the government may find it easier to prevail than a private party be-
cause disclosure to the government may not raise as many concerns
as disclosure to a private party.
Nothing in Douglas Oil, however, requires a district court to pretend
that there are no differences between governmental bodies and private
parties. The Douglas Oil standard is a highly flexible one, adaptable to
different circumstances and sensitive to the fact that the requirements
of secrecy are greater in some situations than in others. Hence,
although Illinois v. Abbott & Associates and the legislative history fore-
close any special dispensation from the Douglas Oil standard for gov-
ernment agencies, the standard itself accomodates any relevant
considerations, peculiar to government movants, that weigh for or
against disclosure in a given case. For example, a district court might
reasonably consider that disclosure to Justice Department attorneys
poses less risk of further leakage or improper use than would disclo-
sure to private parties or the general public. Similarly, we are informed
that it is the usual policy of the Justice Department not to seek civil use
of grand jury materials until the criminal aspect of the matter is closed.
And "under the particularized need standard, the district court may
weigh the public interest, if any, served by disclosure to a governmen-
tal body .... T87
Thus, although a governmental body and a private party must both
meet the Douglas Oil particularized need test, it will in some cases be
easier for the government to satisfy the criteria of that test.
A great deal of the governing law on this third exception is de-
rived from Sells Engineering and Baggot. These cases were decided on
the same day, both by narrow 5-4 margins. The dissents in both
84 Sells Engineering, 463 U.S. at 431.
85 "If, in a particular case, ordinary discovery is insufficient for some reason, the gov-
ernment may request disclosure under a (C) (i) court order." Sells Engineering, 463 U.S. at
431.
86 Sells Engineering, 463 U.S. at 444.
87 Sells Engineering, 463 U.S. at 445 (citations omitted).
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cases demonstrate fundamental differences in the interpretations of
how this exception should be applied.88 Nonetheless, with so few
grand jury cases reaching the Supreme Court, Sells Engineering and
Baggot should remain the law for a considerable period of time, or
until the language of Rule 6(e) is itself modified.
The witness whose grand jury testimony is sought to be dis-
closed, or the owner of the documents sought to be disclosed has
standing to intervene in a motion to disclose under this exception. 9
Because the witness normally would not be aware of the filing of
such a motion, it is up to the party filing the request or the court
itself to offer the witness an opportunity to intervene. If an order
adverse to the witness is issued by the court, that order may be ap-
pealed by the witness if the litigation of the disclosure motion is the
only pending federal proceeding.90 The hearing itself on a motion
to disclose pursuant to this exception is normally ex parte in the
sense that the target of the grand jury investigation has no right to
be present, or even to be given notice, unless it is the target's testi-
mony or documents that are sought to be disclosed.
The Rule itself is silent on whether such a hearing should be ex
parte. The Advisory Committee notes that "[it is contemplated that
the judicial hearing in connection with the application for a court
order by the government under subparagraph (3) (c) (i) should be ex
parte so as to preserve, to the maximum extent possible, grand jury
secrecy." 91 Although at least one court has determined that an ex
parte hearing on a motion to disclose is appropriate and consistent
with the intent of Congress, 92 the legislative history is equivocal.
9 3
Not unexpectedly, courts have split on this issue, with some al-
lowing an adversary proceeding,94 and others allowing an ex parte
88 For a critique of Sells Engineering, see Walker, United States v. Sells Engineering: a
Result to Promote Grand Jury Secrecy, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 99 (1983).
89 FED. R. GRiM. P. 24(a)(2). See Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. 211, 218 n.8 (1979); In the
Matter of Grand Jury Proceedings (Miller Brewing Co.), 687 F.2d 1079 (7th Cir.
1982)[hereinafter cited as In re Miller Brewing].
90 In re Miller Brewing, 687 F.2d 1079; In re GrandJury Investigation (NewJersey State
Commission of Investigation), 630 F.2d 996 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1081
(1981); United States v. Sobotka, 623 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1980).
91 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) advisory committee note.
92 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, April 1978, at Baltimore, 581 F.2d 1103, 1110 n.15
(4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979).
93 Compare S.REP. No. 354, 95th Cong. Ist Sess. 8, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 527, 532, with 123 CONG. REC. 25195 (1977).
94 E.g., In re Miller Brewing, 687 F.2d 1079; State of Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 889 (1977); United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers,
Inc., 280 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1960); In re John Doe Grand Jury Proceedings, 537 F. Supp.




This hearing may also be related to a motion alleging some im-
propriety on the part of the prosecutor in his conduct of the grand
jury investigation. Even in such an adversary context, the court may
resolve the issue without allowing the intervenor to see the grand
jury material in issue.
96
Requests for disclosure under this exception are normally made
before and decided by the court that has the responsibility for su-
pervising the grand jury whose material is being sought. Where dif-
ferent districts are involved, however, the procedure becomes more
complex. The court that supervised the grand jury can best deter-
mine the need for continued secrecy. The court in which the litiga-
tion is pending will be the most competent to determine whether
the party seeking disclosure has demonstrated a particularized need
justifying the disclosure.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(E) establishes the
procedure to be followed in such a situation:
If the judicial proceeding giving rise to the petition is in a federal dis-
trict court in another district, the court shall transfer the matter to that
court unless it can reasonably obtain sufficient knowledge of the pro-
ceeding to determine whether disclosure is proper. The court shall or-
der transmitted to the court to which the matter is transferred the
material sought to be disclosed, if feasible, and a written evaluation of
the need for continued grand jury secrecy. The court to which the mat-
ter is transferred shall afford the aforementioned persons a reasonable
opportunity to appear and be heard.
This is quite similar to the approach suggested by the Seventh Cir-
cuit prior to the adoption of that portion of Rule 6:
The party seeking disclosure first moves for disclosure in the district
where the grand jury sat. The district court which supervised the
grand jury then makes a written evaluation of the need for continued
secrecy and determines whether the evidence before it justifies disclo-
sure. If the court decides that disclosure may be appropriate, it trans-
fers the requested grand jury materials to the district court where the
current case is pending. Finally, the court with the pending litigation
determines particularized need and balances it against the continued
need for secrecy as expressed by the first court.97
This logical procedure allows each district to consider those issues
most pertinent to its own district.
When the court where the litigation is pending is not a federal
95 E.g., In re GrandJury Subpoenas, April 1978, at Baltimore, 581 F.2d 1103 (4th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979); In re December 1974 Term GrandJury Investiga-
tion, 449 F. Supp. 743, 751 (D. Md. 1978).
96 In re Miller Brewing, 687 F.2d at 1086-87.
97 Id. at 1095-96.
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district court, however, but the U.S. Tax Court (an Article I Court)98
or a state court 99 for example, that court can only advise the district
court that supervised the grand jury as to the need for the grand
jury material. The district court can then determine whether the
particularized need test has been met and issue an appropriate
order.
Although the Rule does not limit the types of people to whom
disclosure can be made under this exception, at least one circuit
court distinguishes between disclosure to state officials and disclo-
sure to people who hold no official position.'00 The Tenth Circuit
seems to believe that, at least in the context of a grand jury investi-
gation, a private investigator is not entitled to disclosure under this
exception.l0 '
In any investigation where disclosure is sought by the govern-
ment to allow someone not employed by the federal government to
review grand jury material, meeting the particularized need test, es-
pecially showing that disclosure is necessary to avoid an "injustice",
is difficult at best. The government would have to demonstrate that
the federal government does not have in its employ a person as
qualified as the state official to whom the disclosure is sought to be
made. If the judicial proceeding is a civil case, the private party
seeking the disclosure probably would not have this problem. The
civil party would not have available to it the second disclosure ex-
ception, and thus would not be put in the awkward position of com-
paring federal employees' expertise with that of state employees.
Another issue raised under this exception is whether a grand
jury witness is entitled to review the transcript of his own grand jury
testimony. The rule of secrecy is itself absolute, subject only to the
five specific exceptions. None of the five exceptions directly applies
to this situation. Thus, the witness must try to fit within this third
exception. Courts are split, however, between those that have held
that a witness must show particularized need for a disclosure to be
authorized, 0 2 and those that have allowed disclosure without a
showing of particularized need.
10 3
98 E.g., id.
99 E.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Wright II), 654 F.2d 268 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1098 (1981).
100 United States v. Tager, 638 F.2d 167 (10th Cir. 1980).
101 Id.
102 United States v. Fitch, 472 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1973); In re Bottari, 453 F.2d 370 (1st
Cir. 1972); Bast v. United States, 542 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1976).
103 Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972); In re Braniff Airways, 390
F.Supp. 344 (W.D. Tex. 1975); In re Craven, 13 Grim. L. Rep. 2100 (N.D. Gal. 1973); In
re Minkoff, 349 F. Supp. 154 (D. R.I. 1972); In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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A prosecutor who honors a pre-indictment request by a witness
to review the transcript of his own grand jury testimony, without the
permission of the court, runs the risk that an allegation of grand jury
abuse on his part may be made later. Such a violation of grand jury
secrecy can give rise to an argument that the resulting indictment
must be dismissed. Even after an indictment has been returned, it
can be argued that under a strict reading of the Rule, a witness
should not be allowed to review the transcript of his own grand jury
testimony. In practice, however, witnesses routinely are given their
own grand jury testimony to review as a part of normal pretrial
preparation.10 4 Similarly, defense counsel usually is provided some
grand jury transcripts as part of normal discovery procedure. 05 Be-
cause the Jencks Act 10 6 mandates that, upon request, prior grand
jury testimony of trial witnesses be provided to defense counsel as a
cross-examination tool, prosecutors rationalize that the showing of
such transcripts to the witnesses and defense counsel is implicitly
authorized by theJencks Act. It is possible that a court may someday
disagree.
Defense counsel also may seek discovery of grand jury material
under this exception. The particularized need that defense counsel
must demonstrate may relate to the ability of the defendant to con-
duct his own defense investigation, identify exculpatory witnesses,
or isrpeach government witnesses.
An example of such an effort is United States v. Watts:
Generally, the defense attorney argued that he needed all the
grand jury testimony because any of it might possibly be utilized to
impeach prosecution witnesses. But as to one witness, whom he was
able to identify by name, defense counsel recited the general nature of
the grand jury testimony sought and specified the prosecution witness
whom he intended to impeach by such testimony. Since the attorney
was seeking to discover that which was contained in secret grand jury
proceedings, he could scarcely have been more specific in demonstrat-
ing the necessary "particularized need" in respect to the one witness.
Thus, the District Court "erred in its denial to the defense of this partic-
ular testimony.
10 7
104 United States v. Garda 420 F.2d 309, 311 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Heinze,
361 F. Supp. 46, 57 (D. Del. 1973); King v. Jones, 319 F. Supp. 653, 657 (N.D. Ohio
1970).
105 FED. R. GRIM. P. 16.
106 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1982).
107 United States v. Watts, 502 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1974). See also United States v.
Achtenberg, 459 F.2d 91, 96 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 932 (1972); United States v.
Duffy, 54 F.R.D. 549, 550-51 (N.D. Il1. 1972). But see United States v. Bruton, 647 F.2d
818, 824 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 868 (1981); United States v. Benton, 637 F.2d
1052, 1059-60 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 645 F.2d 72 (1981); United States v. Natale, 526
F.2d 1160, 1170-71 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 950 (1976); United States v.
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FOURTH EXCEPTION: DISCLOSURE UPON SHOWING OF GROUNDS
TO DISMISS INDICTMENT BASED ON IMPROPER GRAND
JURY PROCEDURES
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) (3) (C) (ii) allows disclo-
sure "when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant,
upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the
indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury."
Disclosure under this exception is difficult to justify, and thus
rarely successful. The standard of particularized need applies to
both C(i) and C(ii) disclosures. Defendants rarely have the type of
specific information necessary to make the required showing and
often find themselves in a "Catch 22" situation. The grounds for
dismissing the indictment may be in the grand jury transcripts. Un-
less defendants can demonstrate the grounds for dismissing indict-
ments, they may not be able to obtain grand jury transcripts. Yet,
without the transcripts, they cannot show the improprieties.
Generalized, unsubstantial, or speculative claims of grand jury
improprieties do not meet the particularized need test.'08 Defense
counsel, however, can sometimes pique the interest of a judge by
showing disturbing events reflected in the material to which the de-
fendant does have access, including discovery material, Jencks Act
statements, or statements of former grand jury witnesses during de-
briefing or pretrial investigation by defense counsel. 0 9 In such situ-
ations, defense counsel can ask that the court review the grand jury
material in camera before determining whether disclosure is appro-
priate under this section. This at least attracts the court's attention
and gets the defendant's foot in the door as a first step to more
elaborate disclosure and, perhaps, motions alleging specific viola-
tions of Rule 6 and grand jury procedures. Even if such motions
eventually fail, they provide the defendant with an opportunity for
greater discovery, and put the government in the tactically disadvan-
tageous position of defending its grand jury procedure.
A frequently cited basis for further investigation by the defend-
ant into what occurred before the grand jury is the allegation that
the government has been responsible for leaking grand jury infor-
mation to the press, and that the defendant has therefore been de-
Anderson, 481 F.2d 685, 692-93 (4th Cir. 1973), afd, 417 U.S. 211 (1974); Gollaher v.
United States, 419 F.2d 520, 527 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969).
108 United States v. Ferreboeuf, 632 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 934
(1981); United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 988 (5th Cir. 1977), vacatedon other grounds,
439 U.S. 810 (1978); United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 507 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974).
109 See United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807 (3rd Cir. 1979).
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prived of his right to an independent and impartial grand jury.' 1 0
This also represents a difficult basis on which to request disclosure
of matters occurring before the grand jury.11 1
FIFTH EXCEPTION: DISCLOSURE TO ANOTHER FEDERAL GRAND JURY
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) (3) (C) (iii) permits dis-
closure "when the disclosure is made by an attorney for the govern-
ment to another federal grand jury." This recent 1 2 exception to the
rule of secrecy does not involve any notice to or approval by a court.
It recognizes the fact that grand jury investigations are becoming
more complex and lengthy. As a result, it is not at all unusual for an
investigation begun in one grand jury to be completed by a second
or even a third grand jury. Sometimes, information developed in a
grand jury in one district is relevant to a grand jury investigation in
another district. It is, therefore, necessary to allow grand jury infor-
mation to flow from one grand jury to another.
Prior to the time this fifth exception became effective, prosecu-
tors had to seek a disclosure order under the third exception, 1 3 al-
leging that the transferee grand jury was the "judicial proceeding,"
and that there was a particularized need for providing the material
to the transferee grand jury. If a court refused to grant the motion
for disclosure, the government was forced to begin its investigation
anew before the new grand jury. The Advisory Committee, how-
ever, recognized that the secrecy of the grand jury is not compro-
mised by the transfer of grand jury information from one grand jury
to another because the transferee grand jury is equally bound by
Rule 6's requirement of secrecy. 1 4
Because this fifth exception to the rule of secrecy is relatively
new, the case law interpreting it has not yet fully developed. Courts,
however, will not necessarily be writing on a dean slate. There is
some case law that deals with how authorized disclosures to a new
grand jury should be accomplished."l 5 The issue usually presents
itself in the context of how the prior grand jury testimony is to be
presented to the new grand jury. Should all or some of the
witnesses be recalled? Should all or some of the prior testimony be
read to the new grand jury? Should all or part of the evidence
110 See generally In re Grand Jury Investigation (Lance), 610 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1980)
(review of cases).
111 Id.
112 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(iii) took effect on August 1, 1983.
113 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i).
114 FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(e)(3)(c)(iii) advisory committee note.
115 See infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
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before the original grand jury be summarized for the new grand jury
by the prosecutor or a federal agent? Should the evidence before
the original grand jury merely be made available to the new grand
jury upon request? What if some of the members of the new grand
jury do not want to review the prior evidence?
A federal agent's summary for a new grand jury of evidence
presented to a previous grand jury has been held proper.1 16 Simi-
larly, such a summary by the prosecutor also has been held to be
proper.' 17 One court dismissed an indictment on grounds of grand
jury abuse, however, because the prosecutor deposited with the in-
dicting grand jury lengthy transcripts of earlier testimony without
first summarizing or reading the transcripts, failed to warn the
grand jury of the questionable credibility of a central witness whose
testimony was contained in the transcripts, deposited transcripts of
irrelevant and prejudicial testimony with the grand jury, and failed
to advise the grand jury of the hearsay quality of some of the live
testimony that they did hear.
118
Some decisions that suggest summarized testimony may not
properly be presented to a grand jury, however, have questionable
vitality in view of more recent decisions. 119 The better procedure is
for the prosecutor to have an agent summarize the prior testi-
mony.1 20 The summary, however, if not a scrupulously fair recount-
ing of all the relevant evidence presented to the prior grand jury,
may be the basis for a motion alleging grand jury abuse and seeking
dismissal of the indictment. Thus, although this fifth exception al-
116 United States v. Wander, 601 F.2d 1251 (3rd Cir. 1979); United States v. Brown,
574 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978); United States v. Litton Sys-
tems, Inc., 573 F.2d 195 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 828 (1978); United States v.
Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977); United States v. Cruz,
478 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
117 United States v. Schlesinger, 598 F.2d 722 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 880
(1979); United States v. Blitz, 533 F.2d 1329, 1344-45 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
819 (1976).
118 United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979). See also United States v.
Gallo, 394 F. Supp. 310 (D. Conn. 1975).
119 For example, the position taken in In re GrandJury Investigation of Banana Indus-
try, 214 F. Supp. 856 (D. Md. 1963) was rejected in United States v. Litton Systems, Inc.,
573 F.2d 195 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 828 (1978); and the rationale underlying
both In the Matter of the May 1972 San Antonio Grand Jury, 366 F. Supp. 522 (W.D.
Tex. 1973) and United States v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Tex.
1977) was rejected in United States v. Brown, 574 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1046 (1978).
120 A summary by the prosecutor puts him in the position of being both a witness and
a lawyer in the same proceeding, in contravention of MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-102 (1979). See United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547 (3rd Cir.




lows the transfer of grand jury information between grand juries, it
does not solve the issue of how that transfer is most appropriately
accomplished.
SIXTH EXCEPTION: DISCLOSURE TO NON-FEDERAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL
Prior to 1985, Rule 6 provided no express method by which
local law enforcement personnel could either participate in a federal
grand jury investigation or receive information involving local
crimes developed by the grand jury. Various procedures had been
used to get around this gap in the rule. Where a joint federal-state
investigation is involved, for example, the state investigators are
sometimes sworn in as deputy U.S. marshalls, thereby making them
federal law enforcement officials who may receive access to grand
jury information pursuant to the second exception to the rule of
secrecy.
The more difficult problem had been to reconcile the need to
provide information of state crimes to local law enforcement per-
sonnel with the "particularized need" test of the third exception to
the rule of secrecy, and the requirement that the disclosure be nec-
essary "to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceed-
ing." 121 Two amendments to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
6(e)(3) were proposed and adopted resolve this issue in favor of
disclosure.
The first amendment to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
6(e) (3) (ii) 122 amends the definition of "government personnel" to
include "personnel of a state or subdivision of a state." The Advi-
sory Committee Notes explain that this amendment is designed to
promote efficient law enforcement:
It is clearly desirable that federal and state authorities cooperate,
as they often do, in organized crime and racketeering investigations, in
public corruption and major fraud cases, and in various other situa-
tions where federal and state criminal jurisdictions overlap. Because of
such cooperation, government attorneys in complex grand jury inves-
tigations frequently find it necessary to enlist the help of a team of
government agents. While the agents are usually federal personnel, it
is not uncommon in certain types of investigations that federal prose-
cutors wish to obtain the assistance of state law enforcement person-
nel, which could be uniquely beneficial. The amendment permits
disclosure to those personnel in the circumstances stated.
It must be emphasized that the disclosure permitted is limited.
The disclosure under this subdivision is permissible only in connec-
121 Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 222.
122 FED. R. C~iM. P. 6(e)(3)(ii) (adopted August 1, 1985).
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tion with the attorney for the government's 'duty to enforce federal
criminal law' and only to those personnel 'deemed necessary . . . to
assist' in the performance of that duty. Under subdivision (e)(3)(B),
the material disclosed may not be used for any other purpose, and the
names of persons to whom disclosure is made must be promptly pro-
vided to the court.
123
Thus, this disclosure is designed to permit local law enforcement
authorities to participate only in a federal grand jury investigation of
violations of federal laws, and precludes this information from being
used for any other purposes.
The second amendment allows a court to authorize disclosure
to local law enforcement personnel of information developed in a
federal grand jury information that involves possible violations of
state laws. Specifically, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
6(e) (3)(C)(iv) provides that disclosure may also be made "when per-
mitted by a court at the request of an attorney for the government,
upon a showing that such matters may disclose a violation of state
criminal law, to an appropriate official of a state or subdivision of a
state for the purpose of enforcing such law."' 24
Several conclusions may be drawn from this new procedure for
disclosure. First, such disclosure may occur only when authorized
by the court. This is unlike the first amendment where no prior
court approval is necessary to involve a local law enforcement offi-
cial in the federal investigation of a federal crime. Second, the stan-
dard for the court to apply in determining whether to allow the
disclosure is a very minimal test. The federal prosecutor need show
only that the matters sought to be disclosed may disclose a violation
of a state criminal law. This is a far easier and different test than the
particularized need test. Disclosure would be almost automatic
under this exception.
Third, the federal prosecutor, not the local law enforcement
agency or prosecutor, must be the moving party. 125 Normally, only
the federal prosecutor knows of the information developed by the
grand jury. Where the local district attorney or police department
has learned of the result of the federal grand jury investigation,
however, as a result of the first amendment, for example, disclosure
cannot be sought under this subsection unless the federal prosecu-
tor agrees to seek the disclosure. Finally, the disclosure may be
made only for the purpose of the enforcement of the state's criminal
123 FED. R. GRIM. P. 6(e) advisory committee note.
124 FED. R. GRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(c)(iv) (adopted August 1, 1985).
125 The U.S. Dept. ofJustice requires that an Asst. Attorney General authorize any
application to a court for disclosure pursuant to this exception. Steven S. Trott, Asst.
Attorney General, Criminal Division, Dept. ofJustice Teletype, August 26, 1985.
1126 [Vol. 75
GRAND JURY SECRECY
law by the local law enforcement official. It does not seem, however,
that the local official receiving the information is limited in his use of
it, as are federal prosecutors as a result of United States v. Sells Engi-
neering, Inc.,126 because Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2)
does not specifically prohibit local officials from disclosing the infor-
mation to others.
The Advisory Committee Notes explain that this new procedure
resolves the problems presented by the particularized need test.
It sometimes happens that during a federal grand jury investigation
evidence will be developed tending to show a violation of state law.
When this occurs, it is very frequently the case that the evidence can-
not be communicated to the appropriate state officials for further in-
vestigation. For one thing, any state officials who might seek this
information must show particularized need. Illinois v. Abbott & Associ-
ates, 103 S.Ct. 1356 (1983). For another, and more significant, it is
often the case that the information relates to a state crime outside the
context of any pending or even contemplated state judicial proceed-
ing, so that the "preliminary to or in connection with a judicial pro-
ceeding" requirement of subdivision (e)(3)(C)(i) cannot be met. This
inability lawfully to disclose evidence of a state criminal violation-
evidence legitimately obtained by the grand jury-constitutes an un-
reasonable barrier to the effective enforcement of our two-tiered sys-
tem of criminal laws. It would be removed by new subdivision
(e) (3)(C)(iv), which would allow a court to permit disclosure to a state
or local official for the purpose of enforcing state law when an attorney
for the government so requests and makes the requisite showing.1
27
CONCLUSION
As the rule of secrecy currently is interpreted, relevant material
is denied to parties who have a legitimate interest in and need for it.
Witnesses and their counsel do not fall within any of the current
exceptions in Rule 6(e); thus, witnesses may be denied their own
prior grand jury testimony. Where substantial time has passed be-
tween a witness' first appearance before the grand jury and sched-
uled second appearance, fairness requires that the witness be
allowed access to the witness' own prior testimony. Where a witness
has retained new counsel after the first appearance and before the
second appearance, that new counsel will not be able to adequately
advise the witness without access to that prior testimony.
From the government's point of view, in a situation like that in
Baggot, why should the IRS not have the fruits of a proper grand jury
investigation once the defendant has been convicted or pled guilty?
126 Sells Engineering, 463 U.S. at 427.
127 FED. R. CRM. P. 6(e)(3)(c)(iv) advisory committee note.
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Forcing the IRS to begin anew to develop the same information is a
costly duplication of effort that serves no purpose other than the
frustration of a proper governmental inquiry. The only one who
benefits is the defendant who has already been convicted.
The basic stumbling block for a more reasonable application of
the rule of secrecy is Douglas Oil's requirement that disclosure is ap-
propriate only where it is necessary to avoid an injustice in another
proceeding. Courts should have the ability to weigh the need for
secrecy-and the interests that secrecy protects-against the com-
peting and legitimate needs of a witness, the government, or per-
haps a third party, and decide on a case-by-case basis whether
disclosure would in any way frustrate the reasons for secrecy, jeop-
ardize any person's rights, or invite collusion or misconduct on the
part of the government. If a court decides that disclosure is appro-
priate after such an inquiry, then disclosure should be permitted.
Although the Supreme Court has described the Douglas Oil test
as a "highly flexible one,"'128 the language of the test is sufficiently
absolute to cause even the most innovative of district court judges
to decline an otherwise proper request for disclosure because of
their inability to point to an injustice in another proceeding that
must be avoided. Courts must begin to follow the Supreme Court's
most recent pronouncements on flexibility and allow reasonable ac-
cess where, on balance, the reasons behind the rule of secrecy are
outweighed by the legitimate needs of the party seeking disclosure.
128 Sells Engineering, 463 U.S. at 445.
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